INTRODUCTION
"Evolution" refers, in the most general sense of the term, to a process of gradual change, so it goes without saying that property rights have, in this sense, evolved. There were at the very beginning no such rights among humans, then some primitive rights appeared, followed eventually by developments that culminated in the full-blown property systems of modern times. A project that aimed merely to describe the course of events would be an evolutionary study of sorts, and would no doubt provide fodder for an evolutionary theory, but it would not amount to one. An evolutionary theory aims to explain why and how what happened, happened. I focus here on two contrasting approaches to explaining the evolution of property rights.
For convenience, I refer to the first approach as COOP, because it relies, at least implicitly, on cooperative collective action, and to the second as CON, because it rests, instead, on a process whereby individual actions simply happen to converge on conventions of behavior. Other labels would be equally apt. COOP 1 could be called the social engineering view, because it sees property as a human invention achieved by design. CON, in contrast, could be called the natural engineering view, because it suggests that property rights emerged, in the first instance, by happenstance, given resource circumstances. Finally, COOP could be labeled the conventional view, because it is far and away the dominant take on our subject, holding a virtual monopoly on the legal literature despite its well-known (and not so well-known, and, in a few instances, hitherto unknown) deficiencies.
CON is the "other" view, routinely neglected or marginalized notwithstanding its virtues.
One aim of the discussion that follows is to make CON salient to legal scholars, particularly those who teach and write about property, more particularly still those who write about the evolution of property rights -who (as we shall see later) usually ignore CON entirely, occasionally mention it in a footnote, or, give it a nod in a paragraph of text. It deserves more. A second and related aim is to extend the reach of CON, which as it stands now is limited more than needs be, chiefly because the CON literature is mostly the product of biologists and game theorists unfamiliar with the wonderful complexities of property regimes. A third aim is to provide a brief intellectual history of COOP and CON alike, together with a more thoroughgoing discussion of modern versions of each of the two viewpoints; and a fourth is to provide a synthetic overview of our subject, the evolution of property rights. My account is synthetic in that it draws together the COOP and CON viewpoints (themselves grounded in a variety of disciplines) and integrates them in a fashion that provides a more satisfactory evolutionary account than can either COOP or CON on its own. And the account is an overview in that it provides a primer on the subject as a whole. Those who know nothing, or virtually nothing, about the evolution of property rights should find their reading rewarded by a good grasp of the basics. Those who already know a great deal are encouraged to skip whatever they find familiar and concentrate on whatever they find fresh (I would be surprised to learn that the time invested carried no payoff).
And all readers should be pleased to see that my treatment, despite its multiple aims, has one very welcome characteristic: It is brief.
The order of march is as follows. Part I begins with COOP, briefly tracing its roots and summarizing its contemporary statement, then examining the shortcomings of the COOP account. Attention turns in Part II to a similar treatment of CON in terms of its roots and the lines of its argument, followed by -1-an analysis that expands the compass of CON and indicates how neatly it responds to several of the problems with COOP -several, not all. Part III concludes with observations that serve to summarize and extend the discussion and indicate its implications for ongoing study of the evolution of property rights.
Any number of novel insights will appear along the way, including (but not limited to) the following:
1. Strictly speaking, COOP is not an evolutionary explanation, whereas CON is. The difference between the two approaches is identical in essential respects to the difference between intelligent design and Darwinian theory as accounts of the origin of species.
2. COOP does not provide a distinctive explanation of property rights in particular, whereas CON does.
A central theme in COOP is that increasing resource values provoked
the development of property rights, whereas CON suggests that increasing resource values threatened the collapse of property rights.
4. COOP assumes but does not explain why, at the genesis, units taken from the shared common resource stock became, once taken, the individual property of the taker, no longer subject to sharing. CON explains the phenomenon.
5. COOP suggests that common ownership was the natural default position and that collective efforts were necessary to overcome inertia and move to individual ownership. Beyond that, COOP maintains that a governing authority was necessary to define and enforce property rights. CON, on the others hand, suggests that under certain circumstances common ownership changed to individual ownership naturally and became the new default. In addition, and under the same certain circumstances alluded to above, the new default could have included the essential rights of a basic property system (to exclude, to use, and to transfer) and could have gone forth with no governing authority to define and enforce those rights. England (1765 England ( -1769 . All of these appear in any number of editions produced by various publishers over the years, and so far as I know there is no standard edition to be cited. This presents no problem in the case of Blackstone, because virtually every edition has star pages, and I cite to these. As to Hobbes and Locke, I cite by page to the editions I used but add, for the sake of those without access to the particular volumes, parenthetical citations to chapters in the case of Hobbes, and to sections in the case of Locke. This is convenient enough because the chapters in Hobbes and the sections in Locke are usually short. I take the same approach in the case of Hume, who figures later.
Hobbes, supra note 2, at 81-84 (ch. 13). Locke, supra note 2, at 328-29 ( § 27). See also id. at 330 ( § 28) ("it is the taking of any 4 part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property . . . ."). Locke's view is reflected in the rule of capture familiar to modern property law, according to which wild animals in their natural condition belong to the first person to kill them, capture them in hand, trap them, or mortally wound them. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175,  -2-I. COOP
A. The Argument
The roots of COOP can be traced back several hundred years, to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and William Blackstone. For our purposes, a very 2 condensed distillate of their views will suffice. Each of them imagined an original situation of open access to a common stock of resources, no ownership, and no civil government (the state of nature). Hobbes figured that any commoner taking a thing out of the common stock would thereafter treat it as has own, but would have to stand ready to defend his possessions against grabbing by intruders.
Commoners might try to enhance the security of their holdings by making contracts among themselves, promising not to interfere with the possessions of others so long as others promised the same in return, but self-help was the only means of restraining promisors from reneging. Hence, Hobbes concluded, life would be marked by ongoing battles. Locke agreed. His labor theory dictated 3 that anything taken from the commons rightly belonged to the taker, provided there was enough and as good for everyone else, but conceded that commoners 4 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1805). The dissent in Pierson argued for an alternative rule whereby ownership would vest in the first person to pursue with a reasonable prospect of capture, id. at 182, and Locke might well have agreed. See Locke, supra, at 331 ( § 30) ("the hare that anyone is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the chase. For being a beast that is still looked upon as common, . . . whoever has employed so much labor about any of that kind, as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature, wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.").
Locke, supra note 2, at 391 ( § 117).
5
Hobbes, supra note 2, at 94 (ch. 15) (need for a governing authority), 109-13 (ch. 17) 6 (governing authority established by force or mutual agreement), 112 (ch. 18) (power of governing authority to make and enforce rules); Locke, supra note 2, at 320-22 ( § § 18-20) (need for a governing authority), 454 ( § 211) (governing authority established by mutual agreement), 460 ( § 222) (power of governing authority to make "rules set as guards and fences to the properties of all the members of the society").
2 Blackstone, supra note 2, at *3. Id. at *4-7. Subsequently, more permanent rights -meaning, given the context, rights that did not depend on minute-by-minute actual physical possession -developed in such items as food, clothing, and shelter, the purpose being to forestall grabbing and the ensuing conflict, and to provide incentives to create commodities for oneself. 8 Eventually, land itself underwent the same transformation from temporary to permanent, under the pressure of scarcity. "As the world by degrees grew more Id. at *7. 9 Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at *8.
12
-4-populous," Blackstone testified, "it daily became more difficult to find out new spots to inhabit," and constant occupation of the same locations rendered them fallow; "the fruits of the earth were consumed, and its spontaneous produce destroyed, without any provision for a future supply or succession." These 9 conditions encouraged the development of agriculture, which, in turn, "introduced and established the idea of a more permanent property in the soil"; land had to be worked, "but who," Blackstone asked, "would be at the pains of tilling it, if another might watch an opportunity to seize upon and enjoy the product of his industry, art, and labor?" So there emerged a system of "separate property in 10 lands, as well as moveables, . . . vested in some individuals . . . ."
11
Blackstone made no mention of the ongoing aggression and retaliation imagined by Hobbes and Locke; to the contrary, he appeared to suppose that commoners respected the (transient, and later permanent) property rights in question and behaved accordingly. But he joined his predecessors by depending, in the end, on a governing authority to make and enforce rules. "Necessity begat property; and, in order to insure that property, recourse was had to civil society" -a system of "government, laws, punishments . . . ."
12
I have mentioned these bits of intellectual history so that readers might appreciate how they resonate in the modern version of COOP, the prototype of Legal Stud. No. 2, Pt. 2 (2002) . "The purpose of the conference was to reexamine the Demsetz thesis, consider possible alternatives or elaborations to it, and develop further empirical evidence either to confirm or disconfirm it." Merrill, supra note 14, at S331. Demsetz, supra note 13, at 350. See also id. at 350 (property rights develop when the 16 gains thus achieved become larger than the costs thus entailed), 353 (discussing "the value and cost of establishing" property rights).
Regarding property rights, Demsetz pictured three "idealized forms of ownership"-17 communal, private, and state. Id. at 354. Later I shall note some inconsistencies among his definitions. A point for now is that Demsetz regarded individual ownership and private property as both referring to the same thing, but they do not; private property includes, but is not limited to, ownership by a single individual. The distinguishing characteristic of private ownership is the right of the owner(s) to exclude nonowners. In the case of a universal open-access commons, there is no private property because no one has the right to exclude anyone, whereas in the case of an - Stud. 131, 143 (2000) (calling the regime described by Leacock a semicommons -a property rights configuration that combines common and private property -in which the right to hunt beaver for other than sale was common property, but the right to hunt beaver for sale was private property). Another way to put the point might be in terms of Smith's distinction between exclusion rights and governance rights. members, who used it for various purposes, including hunting beaver for furs. For a time, the rate of hunting was naturally limited by the Indians' modest needs, but matters changed when a commercial fur trade with European settlers developed in the early 1700s. The demand for furs, the rewards from hunting, and thus the rate of hunting, increased. The run on beaver posed a threat of scarcity. In response, the tribe developed a system of private hunting territories that were allocated to individual families of tribal members; holders of a territory had the right to retaliate against trespassers. History 36 (1972) . McManus learned from historians of the fur trade "that beaver populations were sharply reduced after the introduction of the fur trade in the area," id. at 39, and that the Hudson Bay Company, the only buyer of furs for a time, had to take its own measures to conserve the beaver population, id. at 46. He attributed the overhunting of beaver to, in part, the narrow prohibition on trespass discussed in note 19 supra, which, in his view, had been adopted to provide a form of social insurance against threats of starvation. Id. at 51. One can imagine at least one other contributing factor as well, but I take that up later. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
See Smith, Exclusion, supra note 19, at S457 n. 9 (noting that the "problem of overuse 21 characteristic of a commons was first systematically studied" in 1911, citing literature). But one can go back much further. Aristotle and Aquinas, for instance, both understood that common ownership promotes not just overuse of the resource in question, but also underproduction. See Economics and the Law, at 93, 94 (Peter Newman ed. 1998), referring to the accounts of Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone, and saying that Demsetz told the same story "once again" -an observation which, though on the mark to some extent, neglects Demsetz's distinctive insight into the relationship between property rights and transaction costs, on which see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
-7-It is apparent in his article that Demsetz supposed these measures were a sufficient response to the problem of over-hunting. (He was wrong). His 20 reasoning will sound familiar, as indeed it was. He based his analysis on the economics of common ownership, the details of which were well understood at least a half-century before Demsetz wrote, and the essence of which was 21 expressed by Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone several centuries before that.
22
When a resource is held in common, any commoner who exploits the resource gains the benefits of doing so, whereas the costs spill over onto all the commoners. In contrast, individual rights, where each member of the community is entitled to a separate resource packet, to the exclusion of other members, & Econ. 1 (1960) , which demonstrated that in the absence of transaction costs, all spillover effects of an activity will be taken into account through negotiations among the affected parties.
Hume, whom we shall have occasion to consider more fully a little later, seems to have 24 anticipated Demsetz's point by several centuries. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 538 (Book 3, Part 2, § 7) (1740) (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1965) :
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because it is easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is the abandoning the whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons should agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and would lay the whole burden on others.
-8- the Law, at 144 (Peter Newman ed. 1998).
I focus most closely on the lines of Demsetz's account, because it is the most 27 systematic, but I try to indicate points of (possible) agreement between Demsetz and his predecessors, an exercise which at times requires interpretive readings of the early work. And let me note that whether or not the views of Hobbes and Locke in particular should be taken as descriptive evolutionary accounts, the fact is that their general assumptions about the early situation of humans, and their positive arguments about property rights and the origins of -9-Negotations would bring home to A the costs that his activities impose on others, transforming the costs to them into an opportunity cost to A that he would compare to the benefits he stood to realize were he to continue in his ways.
In contrast to his careful explanation of the manner in which individual rights of ownership economize on transaction costs, Demsetz said little about the process by which rights developed. He supposed that they resulted from "gradual changes in social mores and common law precedents," themselves to some degree the product of "legal and moral experiments" -"hit-and-miss procedures" that selected in favor of cost-minimizing approaches, at least in societies that placed a premium on efficiency. In a later article, however, he said that there would have 25 to be a governing authority involved in the creation and enforcement of property rights; "a right defining and conflict-resolving institution, such as the court system, the legislature, or some community authority, is inevitably part of any property rights system." By this appeal to civil government, Demsetz placed 26 himself yet again in league with Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone, who, by the way, go unmentioned in his article.
B. Assessment
Despite ambiguities in each of the COOP accounts, and points of difference among them, they reflect the same general take on the evolution of property rights. Consider the three main lines of the argument, and the shortcomings of 27 government, have become baselines in much work on the evolution of property rights among humans, as witness Blackstone and Demsetz. For discussion, see Itai Sened, The Poltical Institution of Private Property 11-18 (1997) .
In just what sense something belonged to its possessor varies from account to account.
28
Hobbes supposed only that might makes right. What belonged to the possessor was whatever he could defend, and for as long as he could do so -tenuous, to be sure, but the important feature to note is that Hobbes anticipated defense, not sharing, of the thing taken. In other words, he assumed a practice whereby possessors would act as though what they had taken then belonged to them. Locke went a little further, at least in theory. He reasoned that possessors were rightly entitled to what they took (subject to his proviso), but he fell into accord with Hobbes by acknowledging that non-possessors might regularly and wrongfully ignore this principle. Blackstone went further still. It seems he believed that all commoners respected the possessions of each. Takers, he said, had a right of possession (at first transient but eventually permanent). See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text. Demsetz too obviously assumed that sharing ended with severance; his argument depended on it. Any commoner, he said, would "tend to overhunt and -10-each, in turn. The interplay among these variables is to some degree only implicit in Hobbes and Locke, a little clearer in Blackstone, explicit in Demsetz. Hobbes, for
From Common to
Hobbes, supra note 2, at 83 (ch. 13) (emphasis in original).
30
Another consequence was shirking in the maintenance and enhancement of the 31 resource stock; there was "no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth . . . ." Id. at 82. Blackstone made the same observation. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Recall Locke's view that commoners were entitled as a matter of principle to take from 32 the stock, as long as the supply left would be sufficient to provide for others in like manner (as much and as good for all), but worried that this principle would not be observed, that there would be grabbers. Perhaps he sensed that the tendency to grab would increase as scarcity (or demand) did so.
-12- only a few of which we need address here.
35
As already noted, Demsetz argued that the development of property rights turned on "the value and cost of establishing" them. We have to unpack this shares. Next, distinguish between the "value of establishing" an alternative, on 37 the one hand, and the "cost of establishing" that alternative, on the other. The
The benefits are measured in net terms because any alternative will have advantages 38 and disadvantages, pluses and minuses -independent of the costs of establishing the alternativeso these have to be summed up.
Driven, at least, in societies that put a premium on efficiency. Demsetz, supra note 13, 39 at 350.
Since set-up costs are a one-time thing, and benefits an over-time thing, the latter 40 would have to be capitalized in some way in order to compare them to the former.
In this respect, it is odd that Demsetz cited the development of Indian hunting 41 territories as a relevant example of his argument. According to his reading of the anthropological evidence, the hunting territories were held by families, which is to say they were communal (each territory was a limited-access commons). Communal ownership can give rise to high transaction costs even if the owners are few in number, thanks especially to opportunistic behavior (freeriders, holdouts) that provokes costly haggling, as in bi-lateral monopoly situations. This is why modern property law grants tenants in common and joint tenants the unilateral right to partition their -14-value, v, of establishing an alternative refers to the net benefits (if any) of the 38 alternative once it is in place. The cost, c, of establishing an alternative refers to the costs of putting it in place -its set-up costs. So Demsetz's argument amounts to the proposition that the development of property rights was driven by a three-39 step decision process: estimate the value and the set-up costs of alternative property-rights regimes; eliminate any alternatives as to which v < c; and choose 40 from the remaining alternatives the one that maximizes v -c.
For reasons already suggested, and others soon to be considered, Demsetz was most certainly correct in arguing that the evolution of property rights was affected in part by the relationship between v and c. That relationship has to be considered with great care, however, to determine the likely evolutionary path in any given instance. In particular, there is no reason to suppose that increased resource value usually stimulated the development of individual property rights, as opposed, say, to a limited-access commons. Demsetz's discussion might easily be taken to suggest otherwise because of its exclusive focus on transaction costs, as to which individual ownership has a comparative advantage. But transaction costs are 41 holdings and convert them into ownership in severalty. In this connection, a close reading of the anthropological evidence cited by Demsetz suggests that the family territories were subsequently partitioned off to individual family members -perhaps for the reasons just suggested. See Leacock, supra note 18, at 1 (there was "continual readjustment of band lands to fit the needs of band members. Each Indian has a right to trapping lands of his own . . . .") (emphasis added). That the hunting territories were, prior to partition, a commons, though one limited to family members (which could be few or many), might be another reason the beaver stock was overhunted, as discussed in note 20 supra. Behav. 193 (1981) . Moreover, a strategy might be correlated early on -because possession is sometimes a defensive advantage, or because stronger individuals generally appear as first occupants -yet become uncorrelated later on, as the mere fact of possession becomes a proxy for advantages that in fact no longer hold. Just as the Bourgeois strategy is an ESS, so is its opposite -if possessor, play Dove, if intruder, play Hawk. This ESS is regarded as "paradoxical" because evolutionary theory would seem to rule it out. Animals behaving in anti-Bourgeois fashion would end up constantly moving around, looking for territory and occupying it, only to be quickly displaced. There would be no time for breeding. Maynard Smith was aware of the problem (and of the case of a type of spider that seems to exhibit the paradoxical strategy). See Maynard Smith, supra note 59, at 96-97; see also Kokko et. al, supra note 58 (suggesting a resolution of the paradox).
Maynard Smith's model shows that the Bourgeois strategy can evolve, not that it 67 invariably will. See Hirshleifer, supra note 60, at 23 (development of the strategy depends on a population of individuals "able to distinguish between occupant and intruder situations, and . . . able to execute the appropriate behavioral maneuvers of both Hawk and Dove"). Still, Maynard Smith's analysis "shows that respect for ownership is a possible evolutionary emergence that need not call upon any force other than private advantage. . . . On the human level, a corresponding environmental situation might be expected to lead to a 'social ethic' supporting a system of property rights." Id.
-21-population under the influence of natural selection." 65 Crucial to the evolution of the Bourgeois strategy is the asymmetry of possessor and intruder, an observable characteristic that signals to a contestant the role -Hawk or Dove -likely to be played by an opponent, such that the contestant can act in light of the information provided by the signal. It is not necessary, however, that the status of occupant confer any actual advantage in defending territory. All that matters is that the asymmetry between possessor and intruder "is unambiguously perceived by both contestants." Where that condition holds, Id. at 62. Presumably Sugden substituted utility for reproductive fitness because, in the 70 case of humans, the nexus between possession and fitness is likely to be remote. But still, Sugden noted, much of the biological analysis "can be carried over to the human case." Id. He expanded on this point later, noting among other things that since "so many animals do have an innate sense of possession and territory, it would not be surprising if this were true for our species." Id. at 107. To the same effect, see Stake, supra note 66, at 1763 (humans may share a "hard-wired" property "instinct"); Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. Legal Stud. 649, 657 (evolution may have led to a "hard-wired" defensive attitude regarding possessions and a deferential attitude regarding the possessions of others). Both Stake and Hirshleifer discuss the Maynard Smith model and consider its relevance to the development of property and other rights.
So far as I know, Maynard Smith, who died in 2004, never expressed clear views about the merits of adapting his model to the human situation, but a statement in the preface of his 1982 book, supra note 59, at vii, suggests skepticism. "Paradoxically," he said, "it has turned out that game theory is more readily applied to biology than to the field of economic behaviour for which is was originally designed," for two reasons. First, adaptation requires that Darwinian fitness be replaced by utility -"a somewhat artificial and uncomfortable concept," and second, the concept of rationality comes into play, and "there are grounds for doubting whether human beings always behave rationally." because of an endowment effect, according to which an individual puts a systematically higher value on something possessed than on an opportunity to possess the very same thing. See Herbert Gintis, The Evolution of Private Property, 64 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 1 (2007) (passim); Stake, supra note 66, at 1767. The argument is plausible, but so is its opposite. Rather than generating the convention of deference to possessors, the endowment effect could just as well owe to it, in that deference to possession adds to the value of possession.
For a brief description and discussion of evolutionary game theory, see George J. particularly interesting discussion of possession as the crucial asymmetry. Given that any asymmetry might work (the difference between a strong contestant and a weak one, an attractive contestant and an ugly one, a loud contestant and a quiet one, a greedy contestant and a generous one, a rich contestant and a needy one, and so on), why settle on possession as the decisive factor? Sugden's answer began by noting that the the point of a convention is to guide behavior. For a convention to perform that function, its underlying asymmetry must be, apparent, salient, prominent. Hume thought possession had a natural prominence that led Sugden, supra note 69, at 97, quoting Hume, supra note 24, at 504 n.1 (Book 3, Part 2, 74 § 3, n.1): "As property forms a relation twixt a person and an object, it is natural to found it on some preceding relation . . . ." Hume extended the convention of possession to property acquired by prescription, accession, and succession. Id. at 509-13 ( § 3).
In this connection, it is interesting to recall that the majority decision in Pierson v. 75 Post, discussed supra note 4, opted for first capture of a wild animal, as opposed to the dissent's approach of first pursuit, as the act needed to give rise to ownership. The court selected capture "for the sake of certainty," noting that the alternative of first pursuit, given its ambiguity, "would prove a fertile source of quarrels and litigation." 3 Cai. R. at 179.
See also Carol M. Rose, Property and Persuasion 13 (1994) (noting that possession satisfies a "clear act principle," serving as one of a "commonly understood and shared set of symbols that gives significance and form to what might seem the quintessentially individualist act: the claim that one has, by 'possession,' separated for one's self property from the great commons of unowned things." Sugden, supra note 69, at 107. See also supra note 70.
76
-24-people to converge on it, and Sugden agreed. If the idea is to find a way of assigning objects to people, there is, he thought, "a natural prominence to solutions that based the assignment on some pre-existing relation between persons and objects." Possession is, by the same token, usually unambiguous, an But see the discussion in note 82 infra. Rev. 281, 289 (1979) (observing that Demsetz made an unjustified "leap from assuming efficiency-maximizing behavior of individuals to assuming efficiency-maximizing behavior of society").
Oddly enough, Demsetz, in a footnote, took a CON-like approach to costs and benefits, 82 suggesting that private rights in personal property developed among "wandering primitive peoples" because personal property was easier to police than real property. See Demsetz, supra note 13, at 353 n.7. Demsetz could have avoided many points of criticism had he pursued this line of analysis more extensively in the course of defending the thesis of his article.
-26-possession could break down. A severed unit shared with others would begin to look, as the number of others increased, exactly like a part of the common stock; the crucial asymmetry provided by individual possession would no longer be apparent. institution, such as the court system, the legislature, or some community authority, is inevitably part of any property rights system." Supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Costs and
Hirshleifer, supra note 60, at 23. See also Sugden, supra note 50, at 460 ( "[A] society 84 can be ordered without anyone ordering it. In many significant cases, the coordination of individuals' actions can be brought about by self-reinforcing expectations, which evolve spontaneously out of the repeated interaction of self-interested individuals.").
This point is of course as clear as can be in Demsetz's account, but characterizes all the 85 COOP literature as well. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. S421 (2002), referring to the "conventional story [which I label COOP] about the evolution or maturation of property rights. This maturation story emphasizes that, with increases in value and economic activity, property rights become secure, strong, well defined though malleable and divisible, and increasingly private." (Emphasis added.)
-27-plays no role in the CON argument, nor does collective choice of a system. And CON need not deal with set-up costs, because no system is "set up." For all of these reasons, no governing authority is needed to define rights or to enforce them. Hence CON nicely side-steps COOP's begged question of collective 83 action. Its evolutionary explanation does "not call upon any force other than private advantage." But having said as much, we have to note two problems.
84
First, the sort of property regime for which CON so neatly accounts depends on conditions of resource abundance often unlikely to have held in the long run.
Second, the sort of property regime for which CON so neatly accounts falls far short of the complex regimes of modern times, meaning CON provides far less than a complete explanation of the evolution of property rights from their genesis up to the present. Consider each point in turn. 462, 463 (1987) . See also Maynard Smith, supra note 59, at 95 (when v > c, "it is worth risking injury to gain the resource," and "ownership will be ignored").
Even Hume, it appears, was aware of this problem. Discussing government as "an 87 invention very advantageous," he observed that it "it is not necessary in all circumstances, nor is it impossible for men to preserve society for some time, without having recourse to such an invention." The temptation of one man to interfere with the possessions of another "is less conspicuous, where the possessions . . . are few, and of little value, as they always are in the infancy of society." The situation changes as possessions become more dear. Hume, supra note 25, at 539 (Book 3, Part 2, § 8).
-28- property. See, e.g., Sugden, supra note 69, at 99 (discussing a convention recognized on the Yorkshire coast: picking up driftwood and putting it in piles marked with two stones was recognized as a claim to the wood and respected by other gatherers).
-29-(exemplified by Blackstone's "transient property"). A basic regime goes further.
88
Continuous actual possession is not required; owners have permanent property (as Blackstone called it) so long as they maintain contact with their holdings sufficient to give notice of their claims; moreover, ownership (whether individual or concurrent) is recognized to entail the rights to exclude, use, and transferusually regarded as the key elements of "property." Finally, a full-blown regime has all the basic incidents plus myriad others, as in, say, the modern common law system of property, with its many possessory estates, future interests (contingent or not), servitudes, restrictions on alienability, and so on (and on, and on).
Of these three types, CON can obviously explain the emergence of stark regimes. Beyond that, however, it can explain the emergence of basic regimes as well. We can suppose that the first step in the evolutionary move from stark to increasing the probability that the inefficient rules will be filtered out over time. For discussion and criticism, see Posner, supra note 14, at 604.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 423 (1776 , Edwin Cannan ed. 1937 . See also, 94 e.g., Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, at 485, 493 (Peter Newman ed. 1998) (contrasting "individual motivation and unintended collective consequence"); Hirshleifer, supra note 60, at 10 (the "inventor of the bow had an intention, but it was only to help himself or his band; the spread of a new technique of hunting . . . was surely beyond his purpose.").
See, e.g., Hirshleifer, supra note 60, at 9-10, contrasting "evolution" on the one hand, 95 and "design" on the other, and saying: "When we speak of evolutionary changes in human affairs, we generally have in mind "unintended" ones." Dawkins makes an observation about explanations based on design that happens to highlight the central, question-begging flaw in the COOP argument; "ultimately," he says, "design cannot explain anything because there is an inevitable regression to the problem of the origin of the designer." Richard Dawkins, The Ancestor's Tale 602 (2005).
-31-exclude all intentions, but only any intention to achieve the particular developments in question. Adam Smith long ago highlighted the distinction in But here it is important to note one qualification, which I mention only in passing. The 107 problem of instability in the event of increasing resource value, as opposed to the problem of designing and implementing complex property regimes, could have been handled by an authority entitled only to enforce (but not to create) rights, and it is possible that such enforcement authorities themselves evolved in the strict (invisible-hand) sense. Nozick, for example, suggested (demonstrated?) that in any given location a private protective association could have developed to enforce rights, then consolidated in the form of a dominant protective association, followed in turn by a minimal state, all by way of an invisible-hand process. His discussion is complex and spread over many pages, but for its general thrust see, e.g., Nozick, supra note 93, at xi, 12-25. See also Christoph Hauert et al., Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment, 316 Sci. 1905 Sci. (2007 (presenting a model suggesting that if individuals have the option not to participate in some common enterprise (such as maintaining a property rights system), they have incentives to join in the endeavor and play the role of punishers against defectors, which incentives they do not have when participation in the enterprise is compulsory).
-35-to each difficulty would appear to be various sorts of governing authorities, the emergence of which CON does not explain. In this respect, CON and COOP 107 have a common shortcoming. We could say that COOP assumes away the question of how governing authorities emerged, and that CON never gets to the question of how governing authorities emerged.
3. The Emergence of Governing Authorities. -As indicated in the timeline, governing authorities emerged only in the last 10 millennia. They provided the means to deal with instability by enforcing rights, and to move from basic to complex property regimes. While neither COOP nor CON, in its own terms, accounts for the emergence of governing authorities, it is easy enough to supplement each with various theories (beyond my interest here) explaining the movement from early chiefdoms to modern governments. Once so supplemented, both approaches can deal with all that has happened in the arena of property rights since day one. But interesting consequences follow from such a move, the following among them.
First, once we have governing authorities in place, there is little occasion for evolutionary explanation, in the strict sense, of subsequent developments on the property-rights front. What governments aim to do, they do by design; they might act with a heavy hand, but they are not guided by an invisible one. Their actions are approached and explained in terms of political economy, not evolutionary Hirshleifer, supra note 60, at 10.
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Here, then, I am expressing agreement with Tom Merrill's observation "that a theory 109 -36-theory (which has no concern with interest groups, agenda theory, voting systems, and so on), notwithstanding that the same general sorts of methodologies, such as game theory, might be put to use in both cases. To this generalization I can imagine only one possible exception, which strikes me as narrow at most. The exception has to do with the process of learning from mistakes -from unintended consequences. Suppose a governing authority does A with the intention of achieving X, but instead achieves not-X. It might from this (and from iterations with further unintended consequences) learn eventually exactly how to achieve X, or learn that X cannot be, or is not worth, achieving. The late Jack Hirshleifer appears to have regarded such a process as strictly evolutionary in the sense that it can lead to a "result . . . very different from that planned," and so it can. But we 108 can never be sure that the governing authority was not purposively using a trialand-error method, aiming all along (intending all along) to learn by doing. In any event, the governing authority will, in light of feedback, usually redesign, or, instead, choose, but again by design, to stay with the not-X it happened to achieve.
To my mind, it is design all the way down.
Second, once we have governing authorities as part of the story, we are likely to stray from a theory distinctively about property rights in particular. Governing authorities -even if we picture ones that might first have developed to deal exclusively with such rights -have a way of extending their reach. So, for example, if we supplement and improve COOP by adding its missing ingredientan account that explains the emergence of government -we end up with a theory about, at the least, law in general, an interesting thing to have, but not a thing distinctively about property. The same follows of course, once CON bumps into the emergence of governing authorities.
109
that explains the evolution of property in a satisfactory fashion must be one that generates predictions that are unique to property and not one that would equally account for the development of other institutions, even if they perform overlapping functions." Merrill, supra note 14, at S334. I am aware, of course, that CON is not a theory exclusively about property conventions, but rather about conventions in general. Even at that, it is ever so much more distinctive and particularized than, say, COOP. I also acknowledge the possibility that one could develop a particularized theory suggesting unique aspects of the relationship between governing authorities and the rules of property they enact. See, in this connection, Sened, supra note 27 (passim). By the legal literature, I mean scholarship by legal scholars, and scholarship (whatever 111 an author's discipline) appearing in legal periodicals. I mention examples from the literature below, but without bothering to give citations by page to particular points. Given my purposes, it seems unnecessary to send readers to pages and footnotes to see what they say, and what they do not say.
-37-Third, notice a consequence that does not follow from supplementing CON with a theory about the emergence of government. To be sure, CON then becomes COOP-like as to all developments following government emergence, but it remains intact as to all that happened before -and, on occasion, to events that might happen still, such as the development of informal or extra-legal systems of property rights that spring up without regard to an overlying formal legal system.
110

C. Con's Place
Given that the CON methodology differs so strikingly from that of COOP, and deals so neatly with COOP's shortcomings, one would expect to see it figuring regularly, and substantially, in the legal literature on the evolution of property of articles on the evolution of property rights to be found in the legal literature, namely Symposium, supra note 15, consisting of twelve articles, two of which mention Sugden (one line in a footnote, three sentences in text), and one of which mentions Maynard Smith (two sentences). Two books about law and social norms, a topic in several ways related to the evolution of property rights, take considerable note of Maynard Smith and Sugden. See Robert Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991) (scattered references throughout, most in connection with theories of cooperation); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 45, 179 (2000) (briefly discussing the norm of deference to possession). CON and its chief contributors go unmentioned in Rose, supra note 22, an entry on the evolution of property rights in a leading encyclopedia on law and economics. Had Professor Rose been aware of the CON literature -the most important items of which were in print but apparently not yet salient (and in fact remain not salient, that being one motivation behind this overview) -she would no doubt have rethought an example in which she imagined two people, A and B, who would be "better off if they cooperate and create a little mutual property regime where each respects the other's rights, but their individual self-regarding motivations lead them to cheat and shirk instead -and hence no property regime arises." Id. at 94. This is the conventional COOP story. CON suggests that "their individual self-regarding motivations" might well have led to deference, rather than cheating.
I know of only one article in the legal literature, as defined supra note 111, that addresses in any substantial way at all the convention of deference to possession that is the centerpiece of CON's account of the evolution of property rights. See Stake, supra note 66.
Corporation of Kingston-upon-Hull v. Horner, 98 Eng. Rep. 807, 815 (1774) .
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-38-articles about subjects other than the evolution of property rights. In one 112 respect, of course, this is unsurprising, because there is little legal literature about the evolution of property rights in the first place. Yet, when we look at what literature there is, we find that CON is regularly marginalized or unmentioned.
113
This situations puzzles me, and I hope it changes. CON promises to add a great deal to understanding the evolution of property rights. Speaking in the eighteenth century, Lord Mansfield observed: "Possession is very strong; rather more than nine points of the law."
And perhaps soever much stronger than 114
